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Abstract
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1 Introduction
The seminal work of Ramey and Ramey (1995) on the adverse effects of volatility on economic
growth has led to a considerable amount of interest in the need to understand the sources of
growth volatility. Notable examples include Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen
(2003) who find that institutions are a fundamental determinant of volatility through a
number of microeconomic and macroeconomic channels, Mobarak (2005) who emphasizes
the role of democracy in reducing growth instability, and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2006) who provide strong evidence that financial liberalization is associated with lower
growth volatility. More recently, Malik and Temple (2009) find an especially important role
for geography since remote countries are more likely to have undiversified exports.
Despite all this work there is remarkably little consensus on which determinants are
the most important sources of growth volatility. We posit that the major reason for
this problem is that the existing empirical studies generally ignore model uncertainty that
typically plague cross-country regressions. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to identify
robust determinants of growth volatility by addressing two key facets of model uncertainty:
parameter heterogeneity and theory uncertainty.
Parameter heterogeneity refers to the idea that the data generating process that describes
the stochastic phenomenon of growth volatility is not common for all observations (countries).
There are reasons to believe that different countries may follow different growth volatility
processes. For example, countries that are facing structural adjustment issues; such as
those experiencing particularly high debt-to-GDP ratios or hyper-inflation, may face greater
financing constraints that reduce the ability of countries to smooth out income across time.
Alternatively, policy instruments that aim to stabilize growth may have different effects for
countries at different levels of development. While the issue of parameter heterogeneity in
growth regressions has been investigated thoroughly by a number of papers, this issue has
not been systematically addressed in growth volatility regressions.
One approach that deals with the problem of parameter heterogeneity is to use threshold
regression models or classification algorithms such as a regression tree. These models classify
observations into stochastic processes depending on whether the observed value of a threshold
variable is above (or below) a sample split value (threshold parameter), which is estimated
from the data. In a seminal paper, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) employed a regression
tree approach to uncover multiple growth regimes in the data. Following a similar strategy
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Papageorgiou (2002) organized countries into multiple growth regimes using the trade share
and Tan (2010) classified countries into development clubs using the average expropriation
risk.1 More recently, Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013b) investigate the impact of public
debt on economic growth using a threshold regression model that allows for an endogenous
threshold variable.
The term theory uncertainty was first coined by Brock and Durlauf (2001) to refer to the
idea that new growth theories are open-ended, which means that any given theory of growth
does not logically exclude other theories from also being relevant. In the present context,
theory uncertainty implies that in the empirical modeling of growth volatility there is no a
priori justification for focusing on a specific subset of explanatory variables. For example
while Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) emphasize the importance of trade openness as
a growth volatility determinant, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003)
argue that institutions is the main source of growth volatility. It is not clear if the correct
model specification should include both theories, or just one (or none) of them, since the
inclusion of one theory; e.g., trade openness, does not automatically preclude the other; e.g.,
institutions, from also being a determinant of growth volatility. However, the estimated
partial effect, say, of any particular determinant on growth volatility may vary dramatically
across model specifications. How should one deal with the dependence of inference on model
specifications?
One way to deal with this problem is to employ Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), which
dates back to Leamer (1978), and was further studied by Draper (1995), Kass and Raftery
(1995), and Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting (1997). Model averaging constructs estimates
that do not depend on a particular model specification but rather use information from all
candidate models. In particular, it amounts to forming a weighted average of model specific
estimates where the weights are given by the posterior model probabilities. BMA has been
widely applied in growth regressions and has proven to be particularly useful in identifying
robust growth determinants; see for example, Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley,
and Steel (2001), Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), Durlauf, Kourtellos, and
Tan (2008), and Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008). However, in the context of growth
volatility the benefits of BMA have been largely ignored. A notable exception is the paper
by Malik and Temple (2009) who employ BMA to identify structural determinants of output
1One difference is that Papageorgiou (2002) employs the threshold regression of Hansen (2000) while Tan
(2010) employs a generalized regression tree algorithm.
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volatility in developing countries.
In this paper, we attempt to deal with both parameter heterogeneity and theory
uncertainty in the growth volatility process by synthesizing threshold regression and model
averaging methods. The existing literature either deals with model uncertainty in the
linear context or attempts to systematically uncover possible nonlinearity/heterogeneity, but
approaches that coherently address both problems at the same time have been lacking. Some
initial attempts in this direction have been made by Brock and Durlauf (2001), Kourtellos,
Tan, and Zhang (2007), and Cuaresma and Doppelhofer (2007). Our paper is closest in
spirit to Brock and Durlauf (2001). Brock and Durlauf show in their paper how researchers
can simultaneously address issues of parameter heterogeneity and theory uncertainty when
the nature of the parameter heterogeneity is known. In the example in their paper, for
instance, they model the a priori heterogeneity between the Sub-Saharan African growth
process compared with that for the rest of the world to be given (known). Here, we treat
the potential sources for parameter heterogeneity as unknown and conduct a series of tests
for the existence of thresholds to identify the strongest evidence for sources of parameter
heterogeneity from the set of growth volatility determinants. Once the source of parameter
heterogeneity has been identified, we then proceed to investigate the robust determinants
of growth volatility. Our methodology can be viewed as an extension of Brock and Durlauf
(2001) in that we employ threshold regression models to estimate the multiple regimes and
account for model uncertainty within and across various threshold regression models.
This paper is also related to several empirical growth papers that use semiparametric
methods such as the varying coefficient model (e.g., Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001)
and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006)) and the partial linear regression model (e.g.,
Liu and Stengos (1999) and Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2001)) to
identify nonlinear growth patterns and model parameter heterogeneity in the cross-country
growth process. More recently, Henderson, Papageorgiou, and Parmeter (2011) investigate
the presence of nonlinearities in the cross-country growth process using non-parametric
regression methods in a context that allows for model uncertainty. In particular, using
a cross-validation procedure that smooths away the irrelevant variables they find that most
individual growth theories are characterized by non-linearities and therefore empirical growth
methods will benefit by incorporating such nonlinearities. Our paper can be viewed as
an alternative methodology that focuses on abrupt as opposed to smooth nonlinearities.
Moreover, the threshold regression model is a parsimonious specification that uses only an
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extra parameter and does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality problems that effect
nonparametric methods.
In particular, we start by investigating the sources of growth volatility in the context
of linear models using a BMA analysis. Our findings highlight the mitigating role of health
via increased life expectancy in reducing growth volatility. This finding is consistent with
that found in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006). If individuals expect to live longer
then they potentially face higher returns to human and physical capital investments, and
are incentivized to make these investments leading to lower volatility. Additionally, we find
evidence that macroeconomic policy via trade openness and public debt increase growth
volatility. These results are also consistent with the literature. As di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2000) have argued, trade openness increases volatility in tradeable goods sectors of the
economy and also reduces diversification in the economy by encouraging specialization.
While they acknowledge that sectors that are open to trade are less correlated with other
sectors of the economy and therefore trade openness also could lead to lower volatility, they
find that empirically, the first two effects trump the latter. With regards to the positive
relationship between public debt levels and volatility, Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli
(2011) have argued that high levels of public debt make countries particularly vulnerable to
shocks because of the response of economic agents to the higher probability of default.
Next, we investigate the presence of multiple growth volatility regimes using threshold
regression models. First, we employ a testing strategy that uncovers the significant regimes
for a range of threshold variables and then use BMA analysis within each regime to uncover
the robust regime-specific sources of growth volatility. Our tests reveal substantial evidence
for parameter heterogeneity over a range of plausible threshold variables. Notably, the quality
of a countrys institutions and financial development appear to be among the most plausible
explanations for the presence of growth volatility regimes.
Since life expectancy, trade openness, and public debt were identified in the linear BMA
exercises to be robust determinants of growth volatility, we also examine the impact of these
variables in the threshold context. Increased life expectancy tends to reduce volatility across
all regimes defined by most threshold variables. However, our results reveal substantial
heterogeneity in the effects of trade openness and public debt on volatility. Both of these
macroeconomic policy variables appear to interact with a countrys financial development,
institutions, degree of ethnic fractionalization, and levels of internal and external conflict
to impact volatility. For instance, trade openness increases volatility only when the level of
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financial development is above a threshold level; the effect is insignificant otherwise. This
result suggests that countries that are particularly open (to the flow of goods and capital)
may also be particularly vulnerable to the effects of macroeconomic shocks. In another
example, high levels of public debt do not translate into higher volatility in all cases. In
fact, their effect is significant when the countrys institutions are particularly bad (below a
threshold level). This result is related to Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013b) who find
that the negative effect of public debt on growth can be found only for countries with bad
institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the canonical linear growth
volatility model and our data. Section 3 presents model averaging estimates of the linear
growth volatility model. Section 4 describes the threshold growth regression model and
presents the results. Finally, section 5, concludes.
2 The canonical growth volatility model and data
description
Following the literature we define the volatility of economic growth, σg,i, as the standard
deviation of the growth rate of real per capita GDP over five 5-year period time intervals
sampled from 74 countries of the PWT 7.0 for 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04, and 2005-




iβ + ui, (2.1)
where xi is a p×1 vector of growth volatility determinants measured with a lag (i.e., sampled
over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99, and 2000-04) and ui is an i.i.d. error
term for i = 1, 2, ..., N . For robustness we also consider two alternative exercises. The first
one replaces the 5-year period lagged values of the determinants with their contemporaneous
2In the growth volatility literature there seems to be no consensus on the way to estimate the standard
deviation. For example, while Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) use a 27-year time
interval to estimate the standard deviation, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) use 5 years.
3The data set includes 70 countries for 1980-84, 73 countries for 1985-89, and all 74 countries for the
remaining periods.
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values. The second one employs a three 10-year period panel data set that allows for a more
precise estimation of long run growth volatility, albeit with fewer pooled observations. All
the robustness results are reported in Kourtellos, Stylianou, and Tan (2014) - henceforth,
we will refer to this as the Online Appendix.
In the absence of strong theoretical guidance we follow the conventional practice and
assume that the process of growth volatility shares the same information set as the process
of economic growth. This suggest that the set of possible theories and their proxies that
have been proposed in the empirical growth literature can also be used in the context of
growth volatility. In particular, we consider determinants from 8 broad categories or theories
of growth volatility: Solow growth theory, macroeconomic policy, institutions, finance,
geography, ethnic fractionalization, health, and conflict.
We start with the Solow or Neoclassical growth variables, which include the logarithm of
population growth plus 0.05 (Population Growth), the logarithm of the average investment
to GDP ratio (Investments), the logarithm of the initial average years of secondary and
tertiary schooling for male population over 25 years of age (Schooling), and the logarithm
of the initial real GDP per worker (Initial Income). Theoretical work by Acemoglu and
Zilibotti (1997) and Koren and Tenreyro (2007) suggest a negative relationship between
growth volatility and initial income. Specifically, richer countries are less volatile because
they are able to achieve a more balanced sectoral distribution of output.
As argued in Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) the traditional
macroeconomic argument links growth volatility to bad macroeconomic policies. To account
for the effect of macroeconomic policy on volatility we use the logarithm of average inflation
rate (Inflation Rate), the standard deviation of the Inflation Rate (Inflation Volatility), the
ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (Openness), the ratio of government consumption to
GDP (Government), and the average public debt to GDP (Debt).
The literature has also documented the positive impact of financial liberalization and
development on economic growth (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and McCaig and
Stengos (2005)) and its negative impact on volatility (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad
(2006)). Following this literature we include two measures of financial (intermediary)
development: (i) private credit by deposit money banks as a share of demand, time and
saving deposits in deposit money banks (BCBD) and (ii) the ratio of deposit money bank
claims on domestic non-financial real sector to the sum of deposit money bank and Central
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Bank’s claims on domestic non-financial real sector (DBACBA).4
Following the recent literature in economic growth that emphasizes the role of
fundamental determinants we include variables that measure institutions, geography and
climate, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. For institutions we use six variables that proxy
different aspects of a country’s institutional quality as suggested by a number of papers in the
literature; see for example Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003), Mobarak
(2005), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006). In particular, we include the variable
constraints placed on the executive (Executive Constraints), which measures institutional and
other constraints that are placed on presidents and dictators (or monarchies). As argued by
Acemoglu-et-al, countries with weak institutions are more likely to experience high volatility.
Institutions; e.g., constraints on the executive, could potentially affect volatility in either
direction. Effective constraints on executive discretion could result in less arbitrary shifts
in policy and therefore reduce uncertainty and associated volatility. Alternatively, tight
constraints on the executive might lead to an inability to respond flexibly to crises and/or
policy deadlock resulting in higher levels of volatility. We also include a variable measuring
the level of institutionalized democracy, which ranges from zero to ten where higher values
equal a greater extent of institutionalized democracy. Additionally, we use Corruption, Law
and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality. Finally, we control for the presence of political stability
measured as the average of the first differences (in absolute values) of the Polity2 variable
from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of the degree of democracy in a country
with a score of +10 representing most democratic and -10 signifying most autocratic.
Geographic and climatic characteristics have also been associated with growth volatility.
Using a BMAmethodology Malik and Temple (2009) found robust evidence that geographical
characteristics of countries have effects on growth volatility. Therefore, we include both a
climate variable and a geography variable. The climate variable is the percentage of a
country’s land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the Koeppen-Geiger system
(Tropics) while the geography variable measures geographic isolation, which is proxied by
the percentage of a country’s land area within 100km of an ice-free coast (LCR100KM ).
The role of ethnic fractionalization in economic growth has been documented by
the growth literature. For example, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) suggest that
higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity can result in political disagreements over the provision
4We did not include any financial liberalization variables due to their unavailability for the time periods
of our data.
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of public goods, and its subsequent under-provision. To control for the effects of
ethnic fractionalization on growth volatility we use linguistic fractionalization (Language),
which measures the shares of languages spoken as “mother tongues” due to Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) as well as the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) variables Religion Tensions and Ethnic Tensions that measure the degree
of religion and ethnic tension, respectively.
Finally, following Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) we control for health and
conflict. For health we use the average of life expectancy (Life Expectancy). For conflict we
use two proxies. The first one measures the political violence in the country and its actual
or potential impact on governance (Internal Conflict). The second one measures the risk
to both the incumbent government and inward investment due to several conflict factors
ranging from trade restrictions to a full-scale war (External Conflict).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the pooled data. The variables are drawn from
various sources. A detailed description of the variables and their sources is given in Table
A1 of the Appendix.
3 Model uncertainty in a linear world
In this section we employ the BMA approach to identify robust determinants of growth
volatility in equation (2.1). By robust we mean that our estimates do not condition on a
specific choice of determinants but rather depend on a model space whose elements span
an appropriate range of determinants suggested by a large body of work. The model space
is denoted by M = {M1, ..,MM}. Put differently, model averaging integrates out the
uncertainty over models by taking the weighted average of model-specific estimates, where
the weights W = (w1, ..., wM)
′, reflect the evidentiary support for each model given the data,
D, and which are constructed to be analogous to posterior model probabilities.
In particular, the BMA estimator of β takes the form of a weighted average of model-



















where the first term captures the variance of the within model estimates and the second term
captures the variance model-specific estimates across models. The latter is an additional
source of variance, which does not arise when computing variances in the absence of model
uncertainty. The notation β̂MBMA and V̂
M
BMA emphasizes the dependence of the estimator on
the model space M instead of individual model Mm.
The weights W are given by the posterior model probabilities, which are computed using
Bayes’ rule, so that each weight is the product of the integrated likelihood of the data given
a model and the prior probability for a model. As standard in the literature, we assume
a uniform model prior so that the prior probability that any variable is included in the
true model is taken to be 0.5; see for example Eicher, Papageorgiou, and Raftery (2011).
Following Kass and Wasserman (1995) and Raftery (1995) we approximate the integrated
likelihood of each model by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).5
Our BMA approach is similar to that of Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004)
and Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2011) who employ a “hybrid” model averaging method in
the sense that frequentist probability statements about observables given unobservables are
mixed with Bayesian probability statement about unobservables given observables. So while
β̂MBMA and V̂
M
BMA are effectively Bayesian objects, namely, the posterior mean and variance
of β given data, we report BMA posterior t-statistics for coefficient estimates and interpret
them in the classical sense.6 Additionally, we also report the posterior probability of inclusion
(PIP) for each regressor, which is a more standard way to conduct inference in the context
of BMA. PIP is computed as the sum of posterior probabilities of the models, which contain
that variable. Following Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2012) and Kass and Raftery
(1995) we interpret the values of PIP as follows: PIP< 50% indicates lack of evidence for an
effect, 50% <PIP< 75% indicates weak evidence for an effect, 75% <PIP< 95% indicates
5The BIC approximation to the integrated likelihood implicitly defines that the parameter prior is the
unit information prior, which can be viewed as a special case of the Zellner’s (fixed) g-prior that contains
information approximately equal to that contained in a single observation.
6A caveat of this kind of inference is that the asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic is a mixture of
Normal distributions, which is often characterized by irregular shapes, far away from Normal, and thereby
rendering inference based on classical interpretations invalid.
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positive evidence for an effect, 95% <PIP< 99% indicates strong evidence for an effect, and
99% <PIP< 100% indicates decisive evidence for an effect.
3.1 BMA results for the linear volatility growth model
In this section we discuss the BMA findings for robust sources of growth volatility in the
context of the linear volatility growth model in equation (2.1). Table 2 present the results
from our model averaging analysis sorted by PIP, which is reported in the first column.
The second and third columns present the BMA posterior means and standard errors for
each covariate, respectively. The remaining four columns show LS results from two individual
models: the posterior mode model and the full (or largest) model, which includes all variables
that are included in the model space M. Our reason for reporting the results from the
posterior mode and full model is to provide the reader with the ability to compare findings
via model selection - using the best model (in terms of posterior weights) or a low-bias model
(at the cost of reduced efficiency) with potentially many irrelevant covariates - with those
obtained via BMA.
Our BMA findings highlight the key role of life expectancy. In particular, consistent with
the findings of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) we find decisive evidence for the effect
of Life Expectancy with PIP of about 0.99. The negative and significant posterior mean
at 1% suggests that higher levels of life expectancy result in lower growth volatility. One
interpretation of this effect is that the high probability of survival increases the incentives
for human and physical capital accumulation, which in turn reduce growth volatility.
We also find positive evidence for the effect of Trade Openness and Debt with PIP’s
0.83 and 0.91, respectively. Consistent with the findings of Kose, Terrones, and Prasad
(2003) and Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) the positive and significant posterior mean
at 10% of Trade Openness on growth volatility suggests that more open economies are more
vulnerable to external shocks. The effect of Debt on growth volatility also appears to be
positive and statistically significant at 5%, which implies the harmful role of public debt in
creating volatility; see Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011).
The BMA findings are confirmed by the results from the posterior mode and the
full model. The posterior mode model includes all the model averaging covariates with
statistically significant posterior mean. Interestingly, the posterior mode model also includes
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investments. Note, however, the posterior model probability for the mode model is 0.0530,
whereas the full model has posterior model probability of 0.000 suggesting that the latter is
a rather poor model choice.
A careful look into the individual posterior model probabilities suggests that the
posterior mode model is not a dominant model but rather the posterior mass is spread evenly,
and over larger models, resulting in a high share of important covariates. For example,
beyond the posterior mode, the next best four models carry probabilities 0.0250, 0.0143,
0.0126, and 0.0103.
In summing up our findings it is interesting to note that we do not find evidence that
Solow variables, financial development, geography, and linguistic diversity affect growth
volatility. Instead, we find a role for health via life expectancy and some macroeconomic
policy via trade openness, and public debt.
It is important to realize that the above BMA findings are robust to the extent that the
model space M is adequately specified. If growth volatility exhibits deep nonlinearities or
parameter heterogeneity then the above BMA analysis in the context of linear models can
fail to fully capture the model uncertainty and can yield misleading results. As argued in the
introduction there are reasons to believe that different countries may exhibit different growth
processes in a nonlinear way. This motivates us to investigate the threshold regression model
that allows for parameter heterogeneity or nonlinearity in the following section.
Next we briefly describe the threshold regression model and propose a model averaging
strategy that can account for parameter heterogeneity or nonlinearities.
4 Model uncertainty in multiple growth volatility
regimes
4.1 The threshold growth volatility model
The threshold growth volatility model generalizes the linear model in equation (2.1) by
allowing for the presence of multiple growth volatility regimes. In particular, we employ the
threshold regression (TR) model that sorts the data into two groups of observations, on the
basis of some threshold variable qsi, for s = 1, .., r, r ≤ p, each of which obeys the same model.
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The key feature of this model is that it allows for an estimation of the threshold parameter
(sample split) as well as the regression coefficients of the two regimes. This makes the model
very appealing as it allows for increased flexibility in functional form and at the same time
is not as susceptible to curse of dimensionality problems as nonparametric methods. Then,
the TR can be described by the following two sub-sample regression equations
σg,i = β
′
s1xi + esi, qsi ≤ γs (4.4a)
σg,i = β
′
s2xi + esi, qsi > γs (4.4b)





′ is the vector
of regression coefficients for the low and high regime, respectively.
It is also customary to express the TR in a single equation by defining the indicator
variable
I(qsi ≤ γs) =
{
1 iff qsi ≤ γs : Regime 1
0 iff qsi > γs : Regime 2
(4.5)





sxiI(qsi ≤ γs) + esi, (4.6)
where E(esi|xi) = 0, δs = βs1 − βs2, and βs = βs2. The parameter δs is interpreted as the
threshold effect of xi.
The statistical theory for this problem is provided by Hansen (2000) who proposed
a concentrated least squares method for the estimation of the threshold parameter.
The regression coefficients for the two regimes are obtained using LS on the two sub-
samples, separately. Under certain assumptions the asymptotic distribution of the threshold
parameter γ is nonstandard as it involves two independent Brownian motions. Finally, the
confidence intervals for γ are obtained by an inverted likelihood ratio approach.
4.2 Model averaging results within the growth volatility regimes
Estimation of the threshold growth volatility model requires decisions on the choice of the
set of regressors xi and threshold variable qi. Our strategy in this subsection fixes the set of
plausible threshold variables and then for each threshold regression model it employs BMA
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within each regime to uncover robust and regime-specific growth volatility determinants.7
To decide the set of plausible threshold variables we employ a testing strategy for all the
variables that were used as growth volatility determinants in equation (2.1). In particular,
for each qsi, s = 1, .., p, we test the null hypothesis of a linear model against the alternative of
a threshold, H0 : δs = 0 vs. H1 : δs 6= 0 and discard threshold variables that do not reject the
null of the linear model at 10%. We do so by employing the heteroskedasticity-consistent
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for a threshold of Hansen (1996). It is worth noting that
inference in this context is not standard since the threshold parameter, γs, is not identified
under the null hypothesis of a linear model (i.e. no threshold effect), and therefore the p-
values are computed by a bootstrap method. Specifically, the p-values are computed by a
bootstrap that fixes the regressors from the right-hand side of equation (4.6) and generating
the bootstrap dependent variable from the distribution N(0, ê2i ), where êi is the residual
from the estimated TR model.
Before we consider testing for threshold effects we first need to choose the set of relevant
regressors. One possibility is to use the full set of growth volatility determinants that we
considered in section 3.1. This may sound like a natural choice, especially since we plan to
apply BMA within each regime subsequently. The problem with this solution is that the full
model is a rather poor model in terms of posterior model probability, which may affect the
inference in the threshold regression model. For example a poor model is likely to negatively
affect the size and power of the threshold test. For this reason we focus on the set of robust
regressors, denoted by x̆i, as determined by the rule of “PIP greater than 75%”. The set
of robust regressors in this case includes Trade Openness, Life Expectancy, and Debt. For
robustness purposes we also investigate models with regressors identified by the posterior
mode model. In this case Investments are also added in the set of robust regressors x̆i.
These robustness results are reported in the Online Appendix and show substantially similar
findings.
Table 3 shows in the first columns the results of the threshold test when x̆i is determined
by the rule of “PIP greater than 75%”. Of the 25 potential candidates, 21 threshold variables
appear as plausible threshold variables that sort the countries into two regimes at 10% size
of the test.
7This approach is justified by the fact that the estimator of the threshold parameter is super-consistent
while the regime-specific regression coefficient estimators are root-n consistent and thereby the latter can be
estimated as if the threshold parameters were known; see for example Hansen (2000).
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More precisely, Schooling, Initial Income, Debt, Government, Executive Constraints,
Bureaucratic Quality, Democracy, External Conflict, Corruption, Law and Order, Ethnic
Tensions, BCBD, DBACBA, Life Expectancy, LCR100KM and Tropics, reject the null of
the linear model at 1% size of the test. Additionally, Inflation Volatility, Internal Conflict,
Religion Tensions and Language reject the null at 5% size of the test and Inflation Rate
reject the null at 10% size of the test.
The next five columns of Table 3 present results from the estimation of the corresponding
threshold regression model including the threshold estimate, the confidence interval for the
threshold parameter, the joint sum of squares (JSSE), and the sample sizes of the two
regimes. For the models that reject the null at 10%, Ethnic Tensions yields the lowest JSSE
suggesting that it is the most plausible sample splitting variable if one uses the JSSE as
a model selection criterion. The sample split of Ethnic Tensions at 0.8028 corresponds to
New Zealand. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the countries sorted into the two regimes
of Ethnic Tensions. Interestingly, when use the posterior mode model to determine the
regressors in x̆i, we also find that the threshold regression model with the smallest JSSE is
the one that uses Ethnic Tensions as a threshold variable.
Table 3 also shows that the differences in JSSE between the competing threshold models
are rather small. But, does this imply that the actual country groupings are also similar?
To answer this question we present in Table 4 the regime-specific sample means of growth
volatility and the regressors of the threshold regression model. It appears that the sample
means between the ‘bad’ and ‘good’ regimes are not very different. For instance, the sample
of mean of growth volatility in the low democratic regime is 0.04180 while in the high
inflation volatility regime the sample mean is 0.0429, suggesting that the two groupings are
not substantially different but rather the interpretation is different. Therefore, we choose to
present the results for all 21 threshold regression models rather than focus only on the best
model according to the JSSE criterion.
Table 5 shows the BMA results for the two regimes that correspond to each of the
significant threshold variables when x̆i is determined by the rule of “PIP greater than 75%”
grouped by growth theory. In this case the set of robust determinants x̆i includes Openness,
Debt, and Life Expectancy. The columns show the regression coefficients for the low and
high regimes for the each of the three robust determinants. All the threshold regression
models include a constant and a trend but they are not reported to save space. We report
the PPI, PM, and the LS coefficient of the full model. To save space we also do not report
14
the corresponding standard errors but simply denote their significance with stars.
We first examine the effect of Openness on growth volatility. We find strong evidence for
parameter heterogeneity. The evidence suggests that trade openness leads to higher volatility
even for countries with good characteristics. Trade openness is associated with higher
volatility even for initially richer countries, countries with deeper financial development, and
countries with good macroeconomic policies (i.e., low levels of inflation and public debt).
However, it is also true that countries experiencing internal tensions (i.e., higher degrees of
ethnic and religious tensions and internal conflict) see a negative (in the sense of generating
higher volatility) impact of trade openness on volatility. These effects are in general decisive
with PIP close to 100% as well statistically significant at 1% for both the PM estimates of
the BMA and the LS coefficients of the full model.
Our results therefore provide us with a richer and more nuanced view of the effect of
trade openness on growth volatility. Trade openness is not globally negative for growth
volatility. Its effects are insignificant for a large class of countries. Trade openness really
only affects countries with a certain set of characteristics. In particular, relatively richer
countries that are more open to trade and capital flows, but which exhibit internal risks in
the form of political vulnerabilities due to internal divisions are particularly sensitive to the
negative effects of trade openness. This more nuanced view also potentially rationalizes the
mixed evidence found in the literature on the effects of trade on volatility. For example,
while Mobarak (2005) finds that trade openness has a negative effect on volatility, Easterly,
Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) find that openness contributes significantly to growth volatility.
Given the findings in this paper, the mixed evidence can be understood as an implication of
omitted parameter heterogeneity.
We obtain a similarly nuanced view for the effects of Debt on growth volatility. High
levels of public debt are associated with higher levels of volatility for countries with lower
levels of initial conditions (both human capital and income per capita), bad macroeconomic
policies (high levels of inflation and public debt, and large government sectors), low quality
institutions (low levels of executive constraints, bureaucratic quality, democracy, and rule of
law and high risk of corruption), adverse geographical conditions (low geographic accessibility
and closer to tropics), higher degrees of internal divisions (higher levels of ethnic and religious
tensions), higher risk of conflict (both internal and external), and lower general health
conditions (low life expectancy at birth). As pointed out in Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan
(2013b), much of the literature on the effects of public debt on economic performance has
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focused on identifying nonlinear effects of public debt. That is, the question has been whether
there is a threshold level for public debt over which debt then has negative effects on growth
and/or volatility. Kourtellos et al. investigated alternative explanations for the negative
effects of high levels of public debt on growth. In the same spirit this paper seeks alternative
explanations for the negative effects of excessive levels of public debt on volatility.
As we noted, Table 3 certainly shows that there is strong evidence that Debt is a
potential threshold variable. Table 5 (Panel 6) also shows that for high levels of Debt, public
debt is associated with higher levels of volatility. Hence, there is clearly evidence for debt
nonlinearities. However, the above results suggest that we also cannot discard the possibility
that the nature of the effect of debt on volatility is driven by the heterogeneous characteristics
of countries. For example, perhaps public debt is only bad for volatility because countries
that have low quality institutions or pursue ill-advised macroeconomic policies generate more
tail-risks for creditors. Countries with better characteristics can sustain high levels of debt
with fewer consequences. At this point, our results suggest that the data cannot distinguish
between the two explanations (nonlinearity vs. heterogeneity), but it also suggests that we
cannot dismiss either.
The results for Life Expectancy are more straightforward. In most cases, higher life
expectancy results in lower growth volatility in both regimes regardless of the threshold
variable. However, the magnitude of the effect generally differs both across threshold
variables and between the low and high regimes for a given threshold variable. In addition,
there is also evidence that the effect of life expectancy exhibits nonlinearity (see, Panel 18
of Table 5) highlighting the mitigating role of higher life expectancy in reducing volatility in
the high Life Expectancy regime.
We finish this section with a caveat. The implicit assumption in our regime specific
BMA analysis is that given a threshold variable qsi, the threshold estimate, γ̂s, based on
the full set of regressors x̆i is also a consistent estimate for all threshold regression models
with regressors x̆mi that belong to the model space M̆ spanned by the set of regressors x̆i.
The justification for this approach is based on a corollary in Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan
(2013a), which says that when the constraints are valid the estimated threshold parameter
for both the constrained and unconstrained problem will converge to the same true value.
In our context the unconstrained model is the threshold regression model based on the full
set of regressors x̆i and the constrained models are the ones based on any x̆mi ∈ M̆.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we uncover growth volatility regimes and identify their robust determinants
using a large international panel of countries. In order to account for both theory
uncertainty and parameter heterogeneity we propose an econometric modeling that unifies
two econometric techniques: Bayesian Model Averaging and Threshold Regression.
We start by investigating the sources of growth volatility among linear models using
a BMA analysis. Our results emphasize the decisive role of life expectancy in reducing
volatility but also find substantial evidence for the positive effects of public debt and trade
openness.
We then shift our focus to modeling parameter heterogeneity in the growth volatility
process by investigating the presence of multiple regimes using threshold regression models.
First, we test for the presence of a threshold effect using a range of threshold variables and
then use BMA analysis within each regime to uncover the robust regime-specific sources of
growth volatility. Our tests reveal substantial evidence for parameter heterogeneity over a
range of plausible threshold variables including proxies for the growth theories of Ethnic
Fractionalization, Institutions, Financial Development, Health, and Geography. Moreover,
Ethnic Tensions, Initial Income, and Law and Order appear to be among the most plausible
explanations for the presence of growth volatility regimes.
Our regime specific BMA analysis shows that there exists substantial heterogeneity in
the effects of trade openness and public debt on growth volatility. Our results provide a more
nuanced view of the effects of these key determinants on economic performance (volatility,
in this case). Their effects are not global but most strongly affect countries with particular
characteristics.
Finally, our results should not be interpreted as strong structural claims but rather as
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Growth Volatility 0.0337 0.0265 0.0031 0.1746
Population Growth -2.7218 0.1706 -3.4129 -2.2768
Investments 3.0338 0.3917 0.8104 4.0862
Schooling 0.6322 0.7363 -2.4161 1.9588
Initial Income 8.5877 1.1932 6.1649 10.711
Inflation Volatility 45.605 347.2624 0.0675 5488.02
Inflation rate 2.2504 1.1563 -0.8462 7.8335
Government 2.1919 0.4275 1.0779 3.1080
Openness 62.8959 34.2447 10.0729 192.91
Debt 73.7224 63.2664 4.2206 665.17
BCBD 0.9851 0.3967 0.1736 3.0004
DBACBA 0.7927 0.1974 0.1007 0.9994
Executive Constraints 0.6708 0.3522 0.0000 1.0000
Bureaucratic Quality 0.5925 0.2980 0.0000 1.0000
Democracy 5.8968 3.9814 0.0000 10.000
Corruption 0.5561 0.2289 0.0000 1.0000
Law and Order 0.6042 0.2536 0.1278 1.0000
Political Stability 0.3819 0.8500 0.0000 5.2000
LCR100KM 0.5094 0.3552 0.0000 1.0000
Tropics 0.4158 0.4353 0.0000 1.0000
Language 0.3698 0.3041 0.0021 0.8980
Ethnic Tensions 0.6643 0.2447 0.1111 1.0000
Religion Tensions 0.7540 0.2284 0.0028 1.0000
Life Expectancy 66.770 10.0303 37.8081 81.569
External Conflict 0.8093 0.1801 0.1486 1.0000
Internal Conflict 0.7189 0.2041 0.0611 1.0000
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Table 2: BMA results for the linear volatility growth model
This table presents BMA results for the linear growth volatility model in equation (2.1). The first column
shows the posterior inclusion probability (PIP), which is the sum of posterior model probablities over all
those models that contain that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the LS coefficient
estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by the posterior model probability. The posterior standard
error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard error (SE). The last four columns report LS estimates of
two individual models: the posterior mode model and the full model. All specifications always include an
intercept and a time trend. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Full
Determinants PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Solow
Population Growth 0.0573 0.0002 0.0027 0.0077 0.0146
Investments 0.7000 0.0072 0.0056 0.0096*** 0.0036 0.0108** 0.0045
Schooling 0.2090 -0.0009 0.0023 -0.0040 0.0034
Initial Income 0.1333 0.0006 0.0017 0.0057* 0.0032
Macroeconomic Policy
Inflation Volatility 0.1917 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000
Inflation Rate 0.3447 0.0009 0.0015 0.0034** 0.0015
Government 0.2063 -0.0009 0.0023 -0.0056* 0.0033
Openness 0.8273 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0001
Debt 0.9083 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000
Financial Development
BCBD 0.1213 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0003 0.0033
DBACBA 0.1117 -0.0019 0.0063 -0.0079 0.0119
Institutions
Executive Constraints 0.0847 0.0000 0.0019 0.0013 0.0190
Bureaucratic Quality 0.0487 0.0000 0.0017 0.0030 0.0086
Democracy 0.0260 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0017
Corruption 0.2247 -0.0028 0.0066 -0.0152 0.0115
Law and Order 0.0687 0.0001 0.0025 0.0077 0.0114
Political Stability 0.0443 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0014
Geography and Climate
LCR100KM 0.0620 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0051
Tropics 0.0443 0.0001 0.0009 0.0025 0.0051
Ethnic Fractionalization
Language 0.2273 -0.0026 0.0055 -0.0066 0.0066
Ethnic Tensions 0.1897 0.0023 0.0055 0.0093 0.0084
Religion Tensions 0.0507 0.0001 0.0016 -0.0014 0.0073
Health
Life Expectancy 0.9917 -0.0010*** 0.0003 -0.0010*** 0.0002 -0.0013*** 0.0004
Conflict
Internal Conflict 0.0857 0.0006 0.0037 0.0053 0.0124
External Conflict 0.1517 -0.0020 0.0058 -0.0174* 0.0105
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Table 3: Threshold tests and threshold estimates
This table presents the threshold tests and threshold estimates. It reports the bootstrap p-value for the test
of the null hypothesis of the linear growth volatility (2.1) against the alternative hypothesis of the threshold
model in equation (4.6) using alternative threshold variables (one at a time) as indicated by each row. ***,
**, and * denote significance of the threshold effect at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, as implied by the
p-value. All underlying models were based on the full vector of regressors that included a constant, a trend,
Life Expectancy, Openness, and Debt. The last four columns present the corresponding threshold estimate,
90% confidence intervals for the threshold parameter γ, the joint sum of squares (JSSE), and the sample size
of the sub-samples.
Threshold variable p-value Threshold Estimate 90% C.I. JSSE n1 n2
Solow
Population Growth 0.3890 -2.9014 [-2.9194, -2.5482] 0.1963 71 294
Investments 0.1860 2.8689 [2.7016, 3.3841] 0.1956 111 254
Schooling 0.0000*** 0.6515 [-0.0255, 1.4262] 0.1897 176 189
Initial Income 0.0000*** 8.6340 [7.0956, 10.0710] 0.1840 186 179
Macroeconomic Policy
Inflation Volatility 0.0380** 5.9386 [1.0965, 13.3535] 0.1944 234 131
Inflation Rate 0.0540* 2.1558 [1.2609, 3.1500] 0.1940 180 185
Government 0.0080*** 2.1890 [1.7108, 2.6556] 0.1867 170 195
Openness 0.2490 58.8923 [30.9846, 99.4150] 0.1977 202 163
Debt 0.0000*** 78.2945 [32.4425, 106.363] 0.1876 247 118
Financial Development
BCBD 0.0000*** 0.6099 [0.6014, 1.3561] 0.1852 55 310
DBACBA 0.0000*** 0.8318 [0.5851, 0.9775] 0.1898 174 191
Institutions
Executive Constraints 0.0000*** 0.6667 [0.1667, 0.9667] 0.1911 168 197
Bureaucratic Quality 0.0000*** 0.7000 [0.2500, 0.9979] 0.1885 213 152
Democracy 0.0000*** 5.6000 [0.0000, 9.6000] 0.1877 143 222
Corruption 0.0010*** 0.7167 [0.3333, 0.8250] 0.1945 277 88
Law and Order 0.0010*** 0.6361 [0.3333, 0.9944] 0.1843 196 169
Political Stability 0.1970 0.2000 [0.0000, 0.6000] 0.1955 280 85
Geography and Climate
Tropics 0.0010*** 0.0013 [0.0000, 0.9926] 0.1908 158 207
LCR100KM 0.0000*** 0.5821 [0.1098, 0.9922] 0.1930 220 145
Ethnic Fractionalization
Language 0.0360** 0.3962 [0.0468, 0.7680] 0.1968 205 160
Ethnic Tensions 0.0010*** 0.8028 [0.3444, 0.9667] 0.1824 222 143
Religion Tensions 0.0290** 0.8556 [0.4778, 0.9833] 0.1969 254 111
Health
Life Expectancy 0.0000*** 66.8759 [54.4005, 76.8134] 0.1890 144 221
Conflict
Internal Conflict 0.0130** 0.9174 [0.4944, 0.9389] 0.1867 299 66
External Conflict 0.0000*** 0.9792 [0.6153, 0.9972] 0.1950 288 77
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Table 4: Sample means of the growth volatility regimes
This table presents the sample means for Growth Volatility, Openness, Life Expectancy, and Debt in the
low and high regimes that were identified by the various threshold regression models.
Growth Volatility Openness Life Expectancy Debt
Threshold Variable Low High Low High Low High Low High
Solow
Schooling 0.0408 0.0271 61.5679 64.1325 60.5726 72.5414 80.9908 66.9541
Initial Income 0.0377 0.0296 63.5192 62.2482 60.1916 73.6059 87.1976 59.7203
Macroeconomic policy
Inflation Volatility 0.0286 0.0429 62.2461 64.0565 69.3237 62.2088 64.2063 90.7208
Inflation Rate 0.0290 0.0384 69.7257 56.2506 69.1791 64.4262 70.1604 77.1882
Government 0.0340 0.0335 61.4522 64.1544 66.8036 66.7409 62.4959 83.5097
Debt 0.0316 0.0381 60.3168 68.2945 68.4300 63.2956 47.7476 128.0936
Financial Development
BCBD 0.0505 0.0307 62.3521 62.9923 60.1508 67.9445 128.1041 64.0741
DBACBA 0.0388 0.0291 61.9630 63.7457 61.1353 71.9034 93.5909 55.6224
Institutions
Executive Constraints 0.0406 0.0279 66.1887 60.0877 59.9897 72.5524 88.8908 60.7870
Bureaucratic Quality 0.0386 0.0269 66.4678 57.8905 63.0384 71.9994 82.6119 61.2656
Democracy 0.0418 0.0285 66.7442 60.4170 59.5747 71.4051 89.0099 63.8751
Corruption 0.0388 0.0178 65.9662 53.2313 64.0316 75.3902 77.5900 61.5484
Law and Order 0.0379 0.0289 64.7331 60.7651 61.7603 72.5803 81.7243 64.4422
Geography
Tropics 0.0273 0.0386 58.8520 65.9825 72.7294 62.2215 69.3136 77.0877
LCR100KM 0.0369 0.0289 56.2770 72.9383 63.6480 71.5072 77.8089 67.5222
Health
Life Expectancy 0.0420 0.0283 60.1857 64.6618 56.2434 73.6292 90.0078 63.1112
Ethnic Fractionalization
Language 0.0316 0.0364 60.6060 65.8298 71.5225 60.6811 69.7974 78.7515
Ethnic Tensions 0.0360 0.0303 64.9187 59.7555 63.0766 72.5041 80.0978 63.8251
Religion Tensions 0.0384 0.0231 65.8978 56.0266 64.2718 72.4871 79.8410 59.7215
Conflict
Internal Conflict 0.0364 0.0217 63.0332 62.2737 64.8217 75.5970 74.9994 67.9374
External Conflict 0.0363 0.0240 61.8535 66.7947 65.2635 72.4054 75.8261 65.8542
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Table 5: Threshold Regressions
This table presents regression coefficient estimates for threshold regression models using threshold variable qi
in equation (4.6). Panels (1)-(21) report the results for various threshold variables grouped by growth theory.
The significance of the corresponding threshold effect is noted with star. Each panel refers to a threshold
regression based on the corresponding threshold variable and shows the posterior inclusion probability (PIP),
the posterior mean (PM), and the LS coefficient of the full model (Full) for the regression coefficients of Life
Expectancy, Openness, and Debt in the low and high regimes. All models included a constant and a trend.
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Regression coefficients for the two regimes
Openness Life Expectancy Debt
Low High Low High Low High
Solow
Panel 1: qi = Schooling***
PIP 0.5187 0.7823 0.8853 0.9807 0.9947 0.4030
PM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006** -0.0008*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0002** 0.0001*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*
Panel 2: qi = Initial Income***
PIP 0.1360 0.9753 0.9860 1.0000 1.0000 0.4340
PM 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0008*** -0.0018*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0001 0.0001*** -0.0009*** -0.0018*** 0.0001*** -0.0001**
Macroeconomic Policy
Panel 3: qi = Inflation Volatility**
PIP 0.9913 0.1743 1.0000 0.2027 0.0623 0.9827
PM 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0010*** -0.0001 0.0000 0.0001***
FULL 0.0001*** 0.0001 -0.0010*** -0.0004 0.0000 0.0001***
Panel 4: qi = Inflation Rate*
PIP 0.9943 0.3530 1.0000 0.9957 0.0940 0.9923
PM 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0001***
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0001* -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0001***
Panel 5: qi = Government***
PIP 0.2583 0.7237 0.2143 1.0000 0.1287 1.0000
PM 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0001***
FULL 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0004* -0.0012*** -0.0001 0.0001***
Panel 6: qi = Debt***
PIP 1.0000 0.0910 1.0000 1.0000 0.5173 1.0000
PM 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0001 0.0002***
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0002** 0.0002***
Table continued on next page ...
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Table 5 continued
Regression coefficients for the two regimes
Openness Life Expectancy Debt
Low High Low High Low High
Financial Development
Panel 7: qi = BCBD***
PIP 0.1530 1.0000 0.8700 1.0000 0.9693 0.5530
PM 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0010* -0.0007*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0001 0.0002*** -0.0012*** -0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0001***
Panel 8: qi = DBACBA***
PIP 0.0820 1.0000 0.9037 1.0000 1.0000 0.3193
PM 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0006** -0.0012*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0012*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*
Institutions
Panel 9: qi = Executive Constraints***
PIP 0.5237 0.8103 0.9800 0.9630 0.9943 0.6213
PM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0007*** 0.0001*** -0.0001
FULL 0.0002** 0.0001** -0.0010*** -0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0001**
Panel 10: qi = Bureaucratic Quality***
PIP 0.0747 1.0000 0.4587 1.0000 1.0000 0.3960
PM 0.0000 0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0012*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0004* -0.0013*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*
Panel 11: qi = Democracy***
PIP 0.5730 0.7700 0.9577 0.9920 0.9983 0.5407
PM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0002** 0.0001*** -0.0010*** -0.0008*** 0.0001*** -0.0001**
Panel 12: qi = Corruption***
PIP 0.6137 0.1880 0.9517 0.1537 0.9893 0.0577
PM 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0001*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0004 0.0001*** 0.0000
Panel 13: qi = Law and Order***
PIP 0.5813 0.1317 0.3180 1.0000 0.9820 0.0650
PM 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0020*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0020*** 0.0001*** 0.0000




Panel 14: qi = Tropics***
PIP 0.1010 0.5350 1.0000 0.3687 0.0910 0.9923
PM 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0015*** -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001***
FULL 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0016*** -0.0005** 0.0000 0.0001***
Panel 15: qi = LCR100KM***
PIP 0.0843 1.0000 0.9810 1.0000 1.0000 0.0650
PM 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0011*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0001 0.0002*** -0.0006*** -0.0012*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
Ethnic Fractionalization
Panel 16: qi = Language**
PIP 0.9810 0.6687 0.9967 1.0000 0.8250 0.3057
PM 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0010*** -0.0012*** 0.0001* 0.0000
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0002** -0.0010*** -0.0012*** 0.0001*** 0.0001
Panel 17: qi = Ethnic Tensions***
PIP 1.0000 0.0887 1.0000 1.0000 0.5567 0.0643
PM 0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0009*** -0.0022*** 0.0000 0.0000
FULL 0.0003*** 0.0000 -0.0008*** -0.0022*** 0.0001** 0.0000
Panel 18: qi = Religion Tensions**
PIP 0.9323 0.2413 1.0000 0.7463 0.9173 0.1160
PM 0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0009*** -0.0004 0.0001** 0.0000
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0001 -0.0009*** -0.0006** 0.0001*** 0.0000
Health
Panel 19: qi = Life Expectancy***
PIP 0.4327 0.6313 0.9147 1.0000 0.9920 0.2093
PM 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0010** -0.0018*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
FULL 0.0002* 0.0001** -0.0012*** -0.0018*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*
Conflict
Panel 20: qi = Internal Conflict**
PIP 0.9983 0.1217 1.0000 1.0000 0.7600 0.1017
PM 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0007*** -0.0037*** 0.0000 0.0000
FULL 0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0007*** -0.0037*** 0.0001*** 0.0000
Panel 21: qi = External Conflict***
PIP 0.8110 0.9160 1.0000 0.9140 0.9930 0.7023
PM 0.0001 0.0002** -0.0008*** -0.0010** 0.0001*** -0.0001
FULL 0.0001*** 0.0002*** -0.0007*** -0.0011*** 0.0001*** -0.0002**
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Table A1: Data Appendix
Variable Description
Time trend Time trend variable for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09.
Growth Volatility Standard deviation of the growth rate of real per capita GDP for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09. Source: PWT 7.0.
Initial Income Logarithm of per capita GDP in chain series at 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 (lag values over the
periods 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000). Source: PWT 7.0.
Population Growth Logarithm of average population growth rates plus 0.05 for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99,
2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04)
Source: PWT 7.0
Investments Logarithm of average ratios over each period of investment to GDP for the periods 1985-89, 1990-
94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99
and 2000-04). Source: PWT 7.0
Schooling Logarithm of average years of male secondary and tertiary school attainment (25+) in 1985, 1990,
1995 and 1999 (lag values over the periods 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995). Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
Debt Public debt to GDP for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values
over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source:IMF, Debt Database
Fall 2011 Vintage.
Government Log of average ratios for each period of government consumption (net of outlays on defense and
education) to GDP for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over
the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: PWT 7.0
Inflation Rate Log average inflation for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values
over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: Worldbank.
Inflation Volatility Standard deviation of inflation for the periods for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04
and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source:
Worldbank.
Openness Average ratios for each period of exports plus imports to GDP for the periods for the periods 1985-
89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94,
1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: PWT 7.0




BCBD Private credit by deposit money banks as a share of demand, time and saving deposits in deposit
money banks. Averages for the periods for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and
2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source:
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2009).
DBACBA Ratio of deposit money bank claims on domestic nonfinancial real sector to the sum of deposit
money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic nonfinancial real sector. Averages for the
periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-
99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2009).
Executive Constraints A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief
executives. This variable ranges from zero to one where higher values equal a greater extent
of institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives. Averages for the periods 1985-
89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94,
1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
Political Stability Political stability is measured as the average of the first differences (in absolute values) of the Polity2
variable from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of the degree of democracy in a country
with a score of +10 representing most democratic and -10 signifying most autocratic. Averages
for the periods for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over
the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Higher values indicate more political
instability. Source: Polity IV, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.




Law and Order PRS assesses Law and Order, separately. The Law subcomponent is an assessment of the strength
and impartiality of the legal system, while the Order subcomponent is an assessment of popular
observance of the law. Higher score means lower risk. Averages for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and
2000-04). The max value for this variable is 1. Source: International Country Risk Guide.
Corruption The PRS measure of the corruption within the political system reflects actual or potential
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-favors”, secret
party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. In PRSs view these sorts
of corruption pose risk to foreign business, potentially leading to popular discontent, unrealistic
and inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market.
This variable ranges from zero to one and higher values mean less risk of corruption. Averages
for the periods for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over
the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: International Country Risk
Guide.
Bureaucratic Quality PRSs bureaucratic quality index gives high points to countries where the bureaucracy has the
strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government
services. In these low risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat autonomous from
political pressure and to have an established mechanism for recruitment and training. Countries
that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points because a change in
government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation and day-to-day administrative
functions. This variable ranges from zero to one. Averages for the periods for the periods 1985-
89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94,
1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: International Country Risk Guide.




Democracy Level of institutionalized democracy. This variable ranges from zero to ten where higher values
equal a greater extent of institutionalized democracy. Averages for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and
2000-04). Source : Polity IV.
Tropics Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the in Koeppen-Geiger system.
Source: The Center for International Development at Harvard University
LCR100KM Percentage of a countrys land area within 100km of an ice- free coast. Source: The Center for
International Development at Harvard University.
External Conflict The external conflict measure is an assessment of the risk to both the incumbent government and
inward investment. It ranges from trade restrictions and embargoes, whether imposed by a single
country, a group of countries, or the whole international community, through geopolitical disputes,
armed threats, exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and
full-scale warfare. Higher values of External Conflict mean lower risk. Averages for the periods
1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-
94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). The max value for this variable is 1. Source: International Country
Risk Guide.
Internal Conflict This is an assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on
governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed opposition to
the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence against its own people.
The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war. Averages for the periods
1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-
94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). The max value for this variable is 1. Source: International Country
Risk Guide.




Religion Tensions Religious tensions may stem from the domination of society and/or governance by a single religious
group that seeks to replace civil law by religious law and to exclude other religions from the political
and/or social process; the desire of a single religious group to dominate governance; the suppression
of religious freedom; the desire of a religious group to express its own identity, separate from the
country as a whole. Higher score means lower risk. Averages for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94,
1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and
2000-04). The max value for this variable is 1. Source: International Country Risk Guide.
Ethnic Tensions This component measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality,
or language divisions. Lower ratings are given to countries where racial and nationality tensions are
high because opposing groups are intolerant and unwilling to compromise. Higher ratings are given
to countries where tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist. Averages for
the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04 and 2005-09 (lag values over the periods 1980-84,
1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). The max value for this variable is 1. Source: International
Country Risk Guide.
Language Measure of linguistic fractionalization based on data describing shares of languages spoken as
“mother tongues”. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).
Life Expectancy Average life expectancy for the periods 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04, and 2005-09 (lag values
over the periods 1980-84, 1984-99, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04). Source: World Bank.
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Table A2: Countries for Ethnic Tensions Regimes
Regime 1≤ 0.8028 Regime 2 >0.8028
Country 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 1985-89 1990-1994 1995-99 2000-05 2005-09
Algeria x x x x x
Argentina x x x x x
Australia x x x x x
Austria x x x x x
Bangladesh x x x x x
Belgium x x x x x
Bolivia x x x x x
Brazil x x x x
Cameroon x x x x x
Canada x x x x x
Chile x x x x x
China x x x x
Colombia x x x x x
Congo Republic x x x x x
Costa Rica x x x x x
Cote d‘Ivoire x x x x x
Cyprus x x x x x
Denmark x x x x x
Dominican Republic x x x x x
Ecuador x x x x x
Egypt x x x x x
Finland x x x x x
France x x x x x
Gabon x x x x x
Gambia x x x x x
Ghana x x x x x
Greece x x x x x
Guatemala x x x x x
Guyana x x x x x
Honduras x x x x x
Hungary x x x x x
India x x x x x
Indonesia x x x x x
Iran x x x x x
Ireland x x x x x
Israel x x x x x
Italy x x x x x
Jamaica x x x x x
Japan x x x x x
Jordan x x x
Kenya x x x x x
Korea Republic x x x x x
Malawi x x x x x
Malaysia x x x x x
Mali x x x x x
Morocco x x x x x
Netherlands x x x x x
New Zealand x x x x x
Niger x x x x x
Norway x x x x x
Pakistan x x x x x
Panama x x x x x
Papua New Guinea x x x x x
Paraguay x x x x x
Peru x x x x
Philippines x x x x x
Portugal x x x x x
Senegal x x x x x
Sierra Leone x x x x x
South Africa x x x x x
Spain x x x x x
Sri Lanka x x x x x
Sweden x x x x x
Syria x x x x x
Thailand x x x x x
Togo x x x x x
Trinidad &Tobago x x x x x
Tunisia x x x x x
Turkey x x x x x
United Kingdom x x x x x
United States x x x x x
Uruguay x x x x x
Venezuela x x x x x
Zambia x x x x x
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